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In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan 
draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between 
“objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinc-
tion between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinc-
tion between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, 
appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the 
“received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “al-
ways about truth,” and enables us to “overcome our [philosophers’] prop-
ositional-bias.” I will argue for two theses. First, fact-ignorance appears 
to be a form of objectual ignorance; and, if this is so, there are no two 
distinctions but only one distinction that Inan in effect offers, which is 
between objectual and propositional ignorance. Second, what Inan calls 
“the received view” can raise some reasonable worries about objectual 
ignorance that are not taken into account by him.
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Inan’s paper (Inan 2016) raises many interesting issues about curios-
ity and its relation to (awareness of) ignorance. The nature of curiosity 
as a mental state and whether awareness of ignorance is required for 
that mental state are philosophically underexplored topics by any stan-
dards, an unfortunate fact which itself calls for some refl ection. Along 
with his previous signifi cant works,1 Inan’s this paper has the potential 
to be an important contribution to the unfairly limited philosophical 
literature on curiosity.
In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions 
Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction be-
tween “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the 
distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is 
1 See for instance Inan (2010, 2012).
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a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According 
to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong 
with the “received view” (286),2 according to which ignorance (or aware-
ness of it) is “always about truth” (286), and enables us to “overcome 
our [philosophers’] propositional-bias” (290). I will argue for two the-
ses. First, fact-ignorance appears to be a form of objectual ignorance; 
and, if this is so, there are no two distinctions but only one distinction 
that Inan in effect offers, which is between objectual and propositional 
ignorance. Second, what Inan calls “the received view” can raise some 
reasonable worries about objectual ignorance that are not taken into 
account by him.
In his attempt to establish the distinction between objectual and 
propositional ignorance, Inan fi rst proceeds by drawing a distinction 
between objectual and propositional curiosity. Inan writes:
When one is curious about who someone is, there will be a description that 
purports to refer to an unknown person; when one is curious about where 
something is there will be a description that refers to an unknown location; 
when one is curious about why something happened, there will be a descrip-
tion that refers to an unknown cause etc. This is objectual curiosity. There 
is then curiosity whose content is given by a full sentence which expresses 
a proposition in the appropriate context. This is what I call propositional 
curiosity. (287)
Inan’s “argument from curiosity” (286) for the distinction between ob-
jectual and propositional ignorance relies on the distinction between 
objectual and propositional curiosity. Inan argues that if there is a dis-
tinction between objectual and propositional curiosity along the lines 
specifi ed above, then given that “the content of one’s curiosity and the 
content of one’s ignorance are identical” (291), then there must be a cor-
responding distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance, 
the former of which “arouses” (288) objectual curiosity and the latter 
of which propositional curiosity. According to Inan, since there are no 
good reasons to deny the distinction between objectual and proposi-
tional curiosity (see 291 and 295), there are no good reasons to deny the 
distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance.
I grant that Inan’s argument from curiosity is valid, and I also grant 
the premise that the content of one’s curiosity is the same as the content 
of one’s ignorance. However, a worry I have about the argument from 
curiosity concerns the degree of its persuasiveness and circuitousness. 
Let me illustrate what I mean by “persuasiveness” and “circuitousness” 
by an example. Suppose that Jane wonders whether infl ation rates will 
increase next year (call the content of Jane’s wondering, C). And sup-
pose that Jack gives her the following argument: infl ation rates will 
neither decrease nor remain unchanged next year (call it P), therefore 
C. Now, assuming that Jack’s argument (or at least a reconstruction of 
it supplemented by the obvious missing premise) is valid, it is not per-
2 All page references are to Inan (2016), unless otherwise noted.
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suasive for Jane. Jane would not have been wondering about whether 
C, if she already had some good reasons to believe that P. Since both 
the premise and the conclusion of Jack’s argument are equally open 
to question for Jane, Jack’s argument does not give her any good rea-
sons to believe the conclusion, which renders it unpersuasive. Now, 
suppose that noticing that his argument does not have the persuasive 
power he thought it has, Jack adds some premises to that argument 
intended as support for P, ending up with a longer, extended argument 
for C. However, it now seems that those premises intended as support 
for P themselves might function as reasons for C, rendering the argu-
ment from those premises to P and then to C unnecessarily circuitous. 
Assuming that Jack’s longer, extended argument establishes C, that 
conclusion could also have been established without going through the 
roundabout way appealing to P. So, Jack’s argument for C either is 
unpersuasive (in the case of the original version) or is (or runs the risk 
of being) unnecessarily circuitous (in the case of the longer, extended 
version).
It seems to me that something similar is going on with Inan’s argu-
ment from curiosity. The distinction between objectual and proposi-
tional curiosity appears to be as problematic as the distinction between 
objectual and propositional ignorance (i.e., if one has some reason for 
doubting one of these distinctions, one thereby has the very same rea-
son for doubting the other), and therefore the argument from the for-
mer (and the premise identifying the content of curiosity with that of 
ignorance) to the latter appears to be unpersuasive. Of course, Inan 
intends to provide support for the distinction between objectual and 
propositional curiosity by attempting to undermine some doubts phi-
losophers might have about it, and this might be thought of as an at-
tempt to render that distinction less problematic than the distinction 
between objectual and propositional ignorance, alleviating the worry 
regarding the persuasiveness of the argument from curiosity. However, 
the problem is that whatever reason Inan brings forth for doubting “the 
propositional-bias” in the case of curiosity (see especially 291) could 
have been easily formulated, with relevant terminological changes be-
ing made, as reason for doubting that bias in the case of ignorance, and 
this shows that the argument from curiosity for the distinction between 
objectual and propositional ignorance is unnecessarily circuitous: as-
suming that the argument from curiosity establishes the conclusion 
that there is a distinction between objectual and propositional igno-
rance, that conclusion could also have been established without going 
through the roundabout way appealing to the distinction between ob-
jectual and propositional curiosity.
My judgment is that Inan’s argument from curiosity is unnecessar-
ily circuitous. Of course, this does not by itself mean that Inan does not 
succeed in establishing the distinction between objectual and proposi-
tional curiosity, nor does it mean that the argument from curiosity for 
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the distinction between objectual and propositional ignorance is unsuc-
cessful. I will take a closer look at Inan’s reasons for the latter distinc-
tion later in the paper; but for now, I would like to assess Inan’s distinc-
tion between two forms of propositional ignorance, truth-ignorance and 
fact-ignorance. According to Inan, “ignorance concerning the truth of 
a proposition” (299) is truth-ignorance. In the case of truth-ignorance, 
“there is a full sentence s whose truth-value is unknown to the agent” 
(301). However, “when an agent knows that a sentence expresses a 
truth but does not know the fact that makes it true” (301), what we 
have is fact-ignorance. According to Inan, knowing that a proposition 
is true does not entail knowing the fact that makes it true.
The distinction between truth-ignorance and fact-ignorance is con-
fusing for the following reason. On a natural view, understanding a 
declarative sentence (or a proposition) requires knowing what needs 
to be the case (or, equivalently for present purposes, which fact needs 
to obtain) if that sentence (or proposition) is true. If this is so, then if 
one understands a declarative sentence and knows that that sentence 
is true, one cannot fail to know the fact that makes that sentence true. 
So, if understanding a sentence requires knowing which fact needs to 
obtain if that sentence is true, as it intuitively appears to be, then fact-
ignorance defi ned as a form of propositional ignorance collapses into 
truth-ignorance: understanding a sentence allows me to know what 
needs to be the case if that sentence is true, and if this understand-
ing is combined with my knowing that that sentence is true, then I 
thereby know the fact that makes that sentence true. Understanding a 
sentence bridges any gap that one might think there is between truth-
ignorance and fact-ignorance as different types of propositional igno-
rance: one cannot fail to know the fact that makes the proposition that 
he understands and knows to be true.
I hold that Inan’s distinction between truth-ignorance and fact-ig-
norance is best interpreted not as a distinction between two varieties 
of propositional ignorance but as (an attempt to reaffi rm) the distinc-
tion between objectual and propositional ignorance. One reason for this 
pertains to the consideration just adduced: we cannot plausibly take 
the distinction as a distinction between two forms of propositional ig-
norance given that understanding a sentence requires knowing what 
needs to be the case if that sentence is true, and understanding a sen-
tence plausibly requires that. This interpretation gets further support 
from the answer Inan provides to the question “how can one know that 
a proposition is true while not knowing the fact that makes it true?” 
Inan writes: “Now the typical way in which this could happen is when 
a sentence contains a term that is inostensible for the subject [a term 
whose referent is unknown to the subject (see 287, fn. 2)]” (297). As for 
the possibility of fact-ignorance, Inan also notes: “When a part of a sen-
tence is inostensible then the whole sentence will also be inostensible” 
(p. 23). Now, if failure to know the fact that makes a proposition true 
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(fact-ignorance), as Inan says, stems from one’s failure to know the ref-
erent of a term or, more generally, one’s failure to know the referent of 
a part of a sentence, then fact-ignorance cannot be propositional (sim-
ply because referents of parts of sentences are not propositions) but at 
most be objectual. In fact, Inan’s “fact-ignorance” is best understood as 
“failure to know the object that is a constituent of the fact that makes a 
proposition true” and as such it falls within the rubric of Inan’s objec-
tual ignorance. So, the only form of propositional ignorance that we are 
left with is what Inan calls truth-ignorance.
This completes my defense of the idea that despite his own adver-
tisement, there are no two distinctions but is only one distinction that 
Inan in effect offers, and that is between objectual and propositional 
ignorance. I will now articulate some ways in which that distinction 
can be challenged.
According to Inan, objectual ignorance is the sort of ignorance the 
content of which cannot be captured by a declarative sentence (or a 
whether-question) but which can be adequately captured by a defi nite 
description.3 There is a particular objection Inan considers and pro-
vides replies to against the idea that there is such a thing as irreduc-
ibly objectual ignorance. Inan writes:
In all…cases [of objectual ignorance] there is a defi nite description that is 
inostensible for the subject who is aware of his or her ignorance. If I do not 
know where my keys are, then “the location of my keys” is inostensible for 
me, given that I do not know its referent. As far as my ignorance goes it is 
irrelevant whether I have a hypothesis concerning what the referent of the 
term is. If, for instance, I entertain the idea that I may have left my keys 
in my offi ce, then there is a full proposition whose truth value is unknown 
to me: my house keys are in my offi ce. This proposition is also inostensible 
for me given that I do not know whether it is true or false, and thus I may 
be aware of my ignorance of it. This however is not the same ignorance as 
in the initial case. Being aware of my ignorance about where my keys are, 
is not the same thing as being aware of my ignorance about whether my 
keys are in my offi ce. If I were to fi nd out that my keys are not in my offi ce, 
I would no longer be ignorant whether they are there, but that would not 
eliminate my ignorance about where the keys are…. If, on the other hand, 
I were to fi nd out that my keys are in fact in my offi ce, then not only the 
proposition, but also the defi nite description will become ostensible. The 
fact that by eliminating my propositional ignorance I thereby eliminate my 
objectual ignorance by no means implies that the two are identical. (293-
294, see also 291)
Let us call the thesis that for every case of objectual ignorance, there is 
a case of propositional ignorance with which it can be identifi ed propo-
sitionalism about ignorance (shortly, PI). If PI is true, then there is no 
such thing as irreducibly objectual ignorance. In the passage above, 
Inan argues for two distinct theses. First, he argues that one’s objectu-
3 In the case of objectual curiosity, there is, Inan writes, “always a defi nite 
description—rather than a full sentence—that refers to some unknown entity 
relative to the curious subject” (291).
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al ignorance about, say, the whereabouts of an object, x, cannot be iden-
tifi ed with one’s propositional ignorance about whether x is in y, if x is 
not in y. This is, Inan maintains, because one can come to know that 
x is not in y and thereby remove one’s propositional ignorance about 
whether x is in y while one’s objectual ignorance about the whereabouts 
of x remains untouched. I take no issue with this argument and am in-
clined to think that it shows what it intends to show, viz. that PI cannot 
plausibly attempt to identify cases of objectual ignorance with cases in 
which propositions about the truth-values of which one is ignorant are 
false.
Second, Inan argues that one’s objectual ignorance about, say, the 
whereabouts of an object, x, cannot be identifi ed with one’s proposi-
tional ignorance about whether x is in y, even if x is in y. Suppose that 
I am ignorant about the location of my keys, and suppose further that 
they are in the bathroom. Inan argues that my ignorance about the 
location of my keys cannot be identifi ed by my being ignorant that they 
are in the bathroom. Inan admits that coming to know that they are in 
the bathroom, acquiring this piece of propositional knowledge, would 
eliminate my objectual ignorance in question; however, he maintains, 
as quoted in the passage above, that “by eliminating my propositional 
ignorance I thereby eliminate my objectual ignorance by no means im-
plies that the two are identical.”
I think the propositionalist about ignorance can rightly protest at 
this point. Let us call the thesis that for every case of objectual knowl-
edge, there is a piece of propositional knowledge with which it can be 
identifi ed propositionalism about knowledge (shortly, PK). The proposi-
tionalist about ignorance can now adopt the following strategy: fi rstly, 
show that PK is true, and secondly, move from PK to PI. The fi rst step 
of the strategy can be plausibly based on the following sort of obser-
vation: I know where my keys are in virtue of knowing that they are 
in such-and-such place, say, in the bathroom. If I know that my keys 
are in the bathroom, that is, if I have that propositional knowledge, I 
also thereby have a piece of what Inan calls objectual knowledge about 
their whereabouts, viz. I know where my keys are. If this is so, then 
objectual knowledge about the location of an object is not something 
extra to propositional knowledge that they are in such-and-such place: 
it does not make sense to try to have objectual knowledge about the 
whereabouts of my keys if I already know that they are in the bath-
room. (This is also true of other sorts of putatively objectual knowledge 
the content of which can be captured by other sorts of wh-questions. 
For instance, I know when the departmental meeting is in virtue of 
knowing that it is at 5 pm today.) This supports the thesis that talk of 
objectual knowledge is merely elliptical, a mere shorthand, for talk of 
propositional knowledge, which in turn supports PK.
Now, the move from PK to PI seems to be trivial: if objectual knowl-
edge (about the whereabouts of my keys) is propositional knowledge 
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(that they are in such-and-such place), then lack of objectual knowl-
edge (objectual ignorance) must be lack of propositional knowledge 
(propositional ignorance). I do not know where my keys are in virtue of 
not knowing that they are in such-and-such place. What I am ignorant 
of when I do not know the location of my keys is that they are in such-
and-such place, and that they are in such-and-such place is a proposi-
tion. So, it appears that talk of objectual ignorance is merely elliptical, 
a mere shorthand, for talk of propositional ignorance and, accordingly, 
that PI is true.
According to Inan, there is irreducibly objectual ignorance, objec-
tual ignorance whose content cannot be captured by a declarative sen-
tence. I think Inan is right in insisting, for the very reasons he himself 
presents, that the content of objectual ignorance cannot be captured 
by false declarative sentences. However, I fail to see any good reasons 
why the content of objectual ignorance cannot be captured by some true 
declarative sentences. It seems obviously correct to say that failure to 
know where my keys are is failure to know that they are in the bath-
room, if my keys are in the bathroom.
Inan is right that the fact that eliminating propositional ignorance 
eliminates objectual ignorance does not imply that objectual ignorance 
is the same as propositional ignorance. However, the question that calls 
for an answer is what it is that explains that fact: why does eliminating 
propositional ignorance eliminate objectual ignorance? The question 
receives a straightforward answer if PI is true. Inan’s account, on the 
other hand, owes us an answer.
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